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SEX IN THE OVAL OFFICE AND COVER-UP
UNDER OATH: IMPEACHABLE OFFENSE?
DANIEL H. POLLnrT*

On October 8, 1998, the House of Representatives, for only the
third time in its history, voted to begin a formal inquiry into the
possible impeachment of the President. As the House considers
whether to use this significant Article I power, Professor Pollitt
offers an historical perspective and comment on the current
situation. Defining the scope of the Impeachment Clause in light
of the framing of the Constitution, state ratificationdebates, and
past impeachments, ProfessorPollitt contends that the President's
actions do not rise to the level of impeachableoffense.
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'
I. INTRODUCTION

President Clinton was deposed in the Paula Jones case on
January 17, 1998, during which he denied an affair with former White
House intern, Monica Lewinsky 2 The President repeated this denial
* Graham Kenan Professor of Law Emeritus, School of Law, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author thanks Brian D. Roark for his assistance in editing
this essay.
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
2. See Francis X. Clines & Jeff Gerth, Subpoenas Sent as Clinton Denies Reports of
Affair with Aide at White House, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1998, at Al. This episode began
when Walter Kaye, who had previously contributed $347,000 to the National Democratic
Committee, recommended Monica Lewinsky for a White House internship. See Jill
Abramson, Clinton Contributor Recommended White House Aide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
1998, at A13. While at the White House, Monica Lewinsky formed a "fateful friendship"
with Linda Tripp and confided to Tripp over the telephone that she was in love with the
President and had had a sexual affair with him. Jill Abramson & Don Van Natta, Jr.,
Friendship of 2 Women Slowly Led to Crisis, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1998, at Al.
Unbeknownst to Lewinsky, Tripp recorded these conversations. See id. Tripp took the
tapes to the attorneys for Paula Jones, who had filed suit against the President for sexual
assault, and Jones's attorneys subpoenaed Lewinsky and the President for pre-trial
depositions, in which both Lewinsky and Clinton denied having had sexual relations. See
Clines & Gerth, supra, at Al.
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to a nationwide audience on January 213 and again on January 27.1

Six months later the President told a nationwide audience, and then a
grand jury, "'I did have a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that was

not appropriate.

In fact, it was wrong.' ,5 Following months of

6
investigation, on September 9, independent counsel Kenneth Starr

sent a report to Congress alleging information that could constitute
grounds for impeachment: primarily perjury, subornation of perjury,
and obstruction of justice arising from Clinton's actions in trying to
conceal his relationship with the former intern.7

Tripp also told Special Counsel Kenneth Starr about her tapes, including one tape in
which Lewinsky told her that President Clinton's friend Vernon Jordan encouraged her to
deny having had an affair with the President. See Abramson & Van Natta, supra, at Al.
The next day, Tripp, wearing a wire supplied by Starr's investigators, met for over four
hours with Lewinsky in a Virginia hotel. See id. It is illegal in Maryland, where Tripp
resides, to record a telephone conversation without the permission of all parties. See MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402 (Supp. 1997). Apparently, it is not illegal to
"wire" a person's conversation in Virginia. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62 (B)(2) (Michie
1995) (providing an exception to wiretapping prohibitions when at least one party
consents). Starr took the Virginia tape to Attorney General Janet Reno, who extended
Starr's authority to investigate the supposed perjury, subornation of perjury, and
obstruction of justice. See Excerpts from Reno Request on Expansion of Whitewater
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1998, at A12.
3. See Clines & Gerth, supranote 2, at Al.
4. James Bennet, Clinton Sharpens Denial, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Jan. 27, 1998, at Al (" 'I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky. I
never told anybody to lie ....
' ") (quoting President Clinton).
5. James Bennet, Clinton Spends 4 Hours with Grand Jury; Tells Nation Liason Was
"Not Appropriate," N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,1998, at Al (quoting the President).
6. The Independent Counsel Act provides: "An independent counsel shall advise
the House of Representatives of any substantial and credible information which such
independent counsel receives, in carrying out the independent counsel's responsibilities
under this chapter, that may constitute grounds for an impeachment." 28 U.S.C. § 595(c)
(1994). Starr was originally appointed independent counsel in 1994 in order to inquire
into alleged financial misdealings arising out of the Clintons' association with Madison
Guaranty Savings & Loan Association and the Whitewater Development Corporation.
See Stephen Labaton, On Early Focus of the Inquiry, Mostly Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
11, 1998, at Al. Although the Whitewater investigation spanned more than three years,
Starr's report to the House contained no grounds for impeachment stemming from this
inquiry. See id.
7. See OFFICE OF INDEP. COUNSEL, REFERRAL FROM INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
KENNETH W. STARR, H.R. DOC. NO. 105-310 (1998).
Starr's report provided
information supporting eleven possible grounds for impeachment. See id. at 129-30. Ten
of the grounds provided in the report related to perjury, subornation of perjury, and
obstruction of justice. See id. at 131-203. According to the eleventh ground, "the
President's actions with respect to Monica Lewinsky constitute an abuse of authority
inconsistent with the President's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws." See
id. at 129; see also id. at 204-10 (discussing the factual basis for the eleventh ground). The
federal statutory definition of perjury is: "Whoever having taken an oath ...that he will
testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration,
deposition, or by him subscribed, is true, willfully ...states or subscribes any material
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Should an impeachment proceeding be instituted, here is how it

would work. The House of Representatives has the "sole Power of
Impeachment"-that is, to bring charges.' Should a majority of the
House vote to impeach, the Senate has "the sole Power to try all
Impeachments." 9 When the President is on trial, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court presides. ° Should two-thirds of the Senators
present vote to convict," punishment may include "removal from
Office, and disqualification to hold [future office] under the United

States.'1 2 Thereafter, the person convicted shall "be liable and
subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, according to
Law."13

It is unlikely that impeachment would ultimately succeed in the
House, if the House members respond to public sentiment. Although
President Clinton has faced intense criticism since the Lewinsky story
originally surfaced, his overall approval ratings have remained

favorable. 4 While many Americans are opposed to his conduct and

subsequent handling of the Lewinsky affair, most people continue to
believe that his actions do not warrant impeachment."
Should the Congress respond to the minority call for
matter which he does not believe to be true." 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994). Subornation of
perjury is defined as the act of "procur[ing] another to commit perjury." Id. § 1622.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
9. Id. § 3, cl. 6.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Id. § 3, cl. 7.
13. Id.
14. In a poll conducted by the New York Times and CBS News published in August,
some 65% of those surveyed approved of the President's job performance. See Adam
Nagourney & Michael R. Kagay, High Marks Given to the President but Not the Man,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at Al. As of late September, a similar survey showed that
only 31% of those surveyed believed that Congress should move forward with
impeachment hearings. See Public Views of the President,Congress and FuturePriorities,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998, at A18 [hereinafter Public Views]. Over half of the people
surveyed said that they would be satisfied if no action were taken against the President.
See id.
15. Throughout this ordeal, Americans, for the most part, have chosen to distinguish
the President's private life from his ability to carry out his job duties. Although only a
third of those surveyed believed that the President shared the moral values that most
Americans live by, Clinton's high approval rating has nevertheless remained constant.
See Nagourney & Kagay, supra note 14, at Al. By an almost three to one ratio, when
asked the most important indicia of whether the President is doing a good job, 56%
answered the ability to manage the government while only 20% answered moral values.
See Public Views, supra note 14, at A18. In contrast, Kenneth Starr is not liked. Most
Americans disapprove of his tactics and believe he is on a partisan vendetta against the
President. See Don Van Natta, Jr., White House All-Out Attack on Starr is Paying Off,
with His Help, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,1998, at A12.
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impeachment, the first critical issue it would face would be: Was it a
"high crime and misdemeanor" for President Clinton to lie when
deposed in the private civil suit filed by Paula Jones, and to persuade
fellow witness Monica Lewinsky to do the same? The answer, if we
heed our heritage, is no. Our history teaches that impeachment is
designed to protect against weighty abuse of official authority or
public perfidy in office-not against private foible or peccadillo. This
has been impeachment's theme since our independence.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The colonists felt the wrath of Imperial Royal Governors.
Rebelling in 1776, they wrote impeachment provisions into their new
state constitutions.' 6 For example, the Virginia provisions provided
that "[t]he Governour ...and others offending against the State ...

by which the safety of the State may be endangered, shall be
impeachable by the House of Delegates."'1 7 This theme continued in
1787 when our Founding Fathers met in Philadelphia to draft a new
Constitution for the union of states.'
The Constitutional Convention opened in May of 1787 and
concluded in early September of that same year. Aspects of
impeachment were discussed periodically. On June 1, the delegates
began discussion of whether the executive power should reside in a
single person, or, rather, be distributed among a multiple number of
persons. This agreement occasioned the first debate concerning
impeachment. 9 On June 2, John Dickinson of Delaware proposed
that the national legislature have the power to remove the executive
upon request by a majority of the state legislatures. 2 Roger Sherman
of Connecticut offered a counterproposal that the national legislature
be given power to remove the executive at its own pleasure l
16. See PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA,
1635-1805, at 59-77 (1984) (noting that eight states included impeachment provisions in
their original constitutional drafts). For a discussion of the development of the concept of
impeachment in English law, see RAOuL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT:
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 7-52 (1973); HOFFER & HULL, supra,at 3-56.
17. 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 382 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) (emphasis

added) (containing the Virginia Constitution as adopted by the state convention on June
29,1776).
18. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 16, at 96 ("The states' experience with
impeachment encouraged the framers of the federal constitution to adopt the measure.").
19. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 64-69 (Max Farrand
ed., 1927) [hereinafter RECORDS]. On June 4, the delegates agreed that the executive
would consist of one person. See 1Id. at 97.
20. See 1id. at 85.
21. See 1 id.
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Because of the "fallibility" of those who select the executive and the
"corruptibility" of the executive chosen, George Mason of Virginia
agreed that some mechanism of removal for the executive was
necessary.' However, he was shocked at Sherman's proposal, which
risked rendering the executive "the mere creature of the
Legislature."'
Hugh Williamson of North Carolina agreed with
Mason and moved that the executive be impeached only on
"conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty."' 4
The matter lay in abeyance until June 15 when William Paterson
presented the New Jersey Plan.' The Plan provided that the national
executive be removable by Congress "on application by a majority of
the Executives of the several States. ' 26 Alexander Hamilton of New
York objected to delegating the impeachment power in a rudderless
manner to the state governors and insisted that there must be
suitable grounds for impeachment.2 7 His standard was "mal-and
corrupt conduct," with all impeachments "tried by a Court to consist
of the Chief or Judge of the Superior Court of Law of each State."'
Discussion of impeachment arose again on July 20. The
Convention had before it a motion that the President "be removable
on impeachment and conviction for malpractice or neglect of duty. 2 9
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina and Gouverneur Morris of
Pennsylvania moved to strike any reference to impeachment,"
Pinckney fearing that such a power would allow the legislature to
interfere with the independence of the executive.3 ' Rufus King of
Massachusetts agreed that impeachment was unnecessary for the
executive in that the executive would "periodically be tried for his
behaviour by his electors, who would continue or discontinue him in
trust according to the manner in which he had discharged [his
office]."'3 King argued that in any event, the executive should not be
impeachable by the legislature, which could undermine the
independence of the executive.33

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

1 id.
at 86.
lid.
1 id. at 88.
See 1 id. at 242.
1 id. at 244.
See 1 id. at 292.
lid2 id. at 64.
See 2 id.
See 2 id. at 66.
2 id. at 67.
See 2 id.
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Other delegates disagreed with the motion to strike any
reference of impeachment from the Constitution. William Davie of
North Carolina, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and George Mason
spoke in favor of some form of impeachment, 34 Mason arguing that
the availability of impeachment was necessary for situations in which
"great crimes were committed. '35 James Madison agreed that the
power of impeachment was "indispensable" in that "some provision
should be made for defending the Community agst. the incapacity,
negligence or perfidy of the [executive]"; otherwise, the executive
"might pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation or
oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers. ' 36 Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts also favored the power of impeachment,
stating that "a good magistrate will not fear [impeachment]. A bad
one ought to be kept in fear of [impeachment]." 37
Because of the arguments presented by his fellow delegates,
Gouverneur Morris changed his opinion regarding the value and
necessity of an impeachment provision in the Constitution. s Since
the executive was to serve for only a term of years, the executive,
unlike the English monarchy, would have no hereditary or life
interest in his office.39 Because such a circumstance could render the
executive susceptible to bribery or a betrayal of trust, impeachment
provided a means to displace the executive should he commit
treachery, corrupt his electors, or become incapacitated.40
The delegates voted eight to two that the executive be
removable by impeachment, and then referred the matter to the
Committee of Eleven (one member from each state) to work out the
details.4' On September 8, the delegates took up the Committee's
recommendation that the President be impeachable in cases of
"treason or bribery." 42 George Mason questioned the limiting of
impeachable offenses to only these two offenses.43 He noted that
34. See 2 id. at 64-65.
35. 2 id. at 65 (emphasis added). Mason said, "No point is of more importance than
that the right of impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above Justice?
Above all shall that man be above it, who can commit the most extensive injustice?" 2 id.
36. 2 id at 65-66.
37. 2 id. at 66.

38. See 2 id. at 68.
39. See 2 iL at 68-69.
40. See 2 id. at 69.
41. See 2 id. The Committee had been formed to work out matters that had been
delayed or not yet acted upon. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL
IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYsIS

42. 2 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 493,550.
43. See 2 id. at 550.

6 (1996).
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treason, "as defined in the Constitution, [would] not reach many
great and dangerous offences," including perhaps "[a]ttempts to
Mason proposed to expand the
subvert the Constitution."'
definition of impeachment by adding the word "maladministration"
to follow the current "treason and bribery."4 5 However, Madison
objected to this proposal, arguing that "[s]o vague a term [would] be
equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate."46 Mason
thereafter withdrew his proposal for "maladministration," offering in
its place the phrase "other high crimes and misdemeanors agst. the
State."'47 On the question thus altered, the delegates accepted
Mason's proposal by a vote of eight to three. 8
The agreement was sent to a Committee on Style and
Arrangements, where the words "agst. the state" were deleted.49 This
Committee had no authority to alter the substance of what the
Convention had agreed upon,50 so the elimination can only mean that
the Committee considered the words redundant, unnecessary
surplusage.5
In sum, the framers of the Constitution saw the need for an
Impeachment Clause "[w]hen great crimes were committed"'52 to
reach "great and dangerous offences ' '53 and to protect against
"betray[al] [of] trust to foreign powers, ' 54 "[a]ttempts to subvert the
Constitution," and "treachery" and "other high crimes and
As such, the Constitution,
misdemeanors" against the state. 5
including an Impeachment Clause, was sent to the states for
ratification.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

2id.
2 id.
2 id.
2id.
See 2 id.

49. See 2 id. at 600.
50. According to the Convention records:

"A Committee was then appointed by

Ballot to revise the stile of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the
House." 2 id. at 553.
51. In Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that
"the Committee of style had no authority from the Convention to alter the meaning of the
[Impeachment] Clause" but "we must presume that the Committee's reorganization or
rephrasing accurately captured what the Framers meant in their unadorned language."
Id. at 231.
52. 2 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 65 (statement of George Mason).
53. 2 id. at 550 (statement of George Mason).
54. 2 id. at 66 (statement of James Madison).
55. 2 id. at 550 (statement of George Mason).
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III. THE RATIFICATION DEBATES
The meaning of the Impeachment Clause is also informed by
statements made during ratification debates in the several states, as
the authors of the new Constitution strove to convey to ratifiers back
home the import of the document's provisions. 6 The Impeachment
Clause received significant attention in a few states. For example, in
North Carolina, James Iredell, who would subsequently serve as a
justice on the new United States Supreme Court, told the state
convention that the Impeachment Clause was meant to guard against
"tyranny and oppression."57 "God forbid," he cried out, "that a man
... should be liable to be punished for want of judgment.... But if a

man be a villain, and willfully abuse his trust, he is to be held up as a
public offender. 58 He supposed that "the only instances, in which
the President would be liable to impeachment, would be where he
had received a bribe, or had acted from some corrupt motive or
other. '59 His illustration was "giving false information to the Senate"
that "induced them to enter into measures injurious to their
country."'

During the course of urging ratification in New York, Alexander
Hamilton addressed impeachment in several essays of The Federalist
Papers.1 Hamilton wrote that impeachable offenses are those that
proceed from "abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated
POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to
society itself." 62 Impeachment might well "enlist all [the] animosities,
partialities, influence, and interest on one side, or on the other," but
this, concluded Hamilton, was preferable to leaving a tyrant in
office. 63

Hamilton warned that impeachment would "agitate the passions
of the whole community, and ... divide it into parties more or less

56. See GERHARDT, supra note 41, at 12-21.
57. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 126 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1968) [hereinafter DEBATES IN
THE STATE CONVENTIONS].

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 127.
61. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 65, 66, 69,79,81 (Alexander Hamilton).
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1911); see also GERHARDT, supra note 41, at 12-17 (calling The FederalistPapers "the
most prominent ratification document").
63. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 62, at 407.

1998]

IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES

267

friendly or inimical to the accused."' This warning that "in such
cases there were always be the greatest danger that the decision will
be regulated more by the comparative strength of the parties, than by
the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt," 65 has often come to
pass during the course of American history.
IV. IMPEACHMENT IN PRACTICE
Our Founding Fathers gave us impeachment, a powerful engine

of justice for use against the President, the Vice President, and all
civil officers when they abuse or violate some public trust. It was not

intended to guard against want of judgment, private peccadillo, or
even scandalous conduct. For example, in 1808, the legislature of
Mississippi requested that the House of Representatives impeach
territorial judge, Peter Bruin, because of the judge's purported
alcoholism. 6 The House refused to impeach. 67 A century later, in
1925, the House Judiciary Committee recommended against the
impeachment of a federal judge in West Virginia who was accused of
being drunk on duty.6 Even worse, the judge was drunk on liquor
that had been confiscated by prohibition agents and stored in the
courthouse for safekeeping. 9
So when does the House impeach and send cases on to the

Senate for trial?

Since 1796, although some sixty or more

impeachment proceedings have been filed, the House has voted to
The following section briefly
impeach only fifteen persons.7'
64. Id. Hoffer and Hull note that "Hamilton's fears were justified, and there was
nothing that the new definition of impeachable offenses could do to stop the politicization
of impeachment and trial." HOFFER & HULL, supra note 16, at 102. "As Hamilton
warned in The Federalist, however, a much less circumscribed form of impeachment
hovered in the shadows: impeachment by a numerically dominant party, to remove its
partisan opponents from office." Id. at 109. Speaking in reference to William Blount's
impeachment trial in Senate, Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison in a letter dated
February 15, 1798: "I see nothing in the mode of proceeding by impeachment, but the
most formidable weapon for the purposes of a dominant faction that ever was contrived."
17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 80 (David C. Mattern et al. eds., 1991).
65. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 62, at 407.
66. See JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CORRuPT JuDGE 225 (1962).

67. See id.
68. See id. at 222-23.
69. See Frank Thompson, Jr. & Daniel H. Pollitt, Impeachment of FederalJudges: A
HistoricalOverview, 49 N.C. L. REV. 87, 115 (1970).
70. See GERHARDT, supra note 41, at 23. Of the fifteen persons whom the House
impeached, the Senate convicted seven, acquitted five, and dismissed two. See id. nn.4-6.
George W. English, a district judge for the Eastern District of Illinois, was impeached for
showing favoritism in the appointment of bankruptcy receivers, but resigned before he
could be tried in the Senate. See 68 CONG. REC. 348 (1926).
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summarizes the thirteen non-presidential impeachments that have
moved from the House of Representatives to trial in the Senate and
the two presidential impeachment inquiries.
A. Non-PresidentialImpeachments
1. William Blount (1798-99)
President Washington appointed Senator Blount of Tennessee to
be Superintendent of Indian Affairs and Governor of the Territory
South of the Ohio River.7 ' Blount betrayed Washington's trust. In
1797, Great Britain was at war with Spain. Blount confided in a
government agent his scheme to organize Creek and Cherokee
Indians to help Great Britain oust the Spanish from Florida and
Louisiana. 72 The agent sent the letter to President John Adams, who
sent copies to the House and Senate. 3 The House impeached Blount
for conspiring to carry on a military expedition against Spanish
territory in violation of the Neutrality Act. 74 In the meantime, the
Senate voted to expel Blount pursuant to its constitutional authority
to "punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member."'75 The Senate then
dismissed the impeachment charges, possibly on the theory that
members of Congress are not "civil officers" and hence, are not
76
impeachable.
2. & 3. John Pickering (1803-04) and Samuel Chase (1804-05)
The impeachments of Judge John Pickering of New Hampshire
and Associate Justice Samuel Chase arose out of a tumultuous
background.77 The Federalists under John Adams foresaw an
election with the Republicans under Jefferson. In 1798, preparing for
this election, the Federalists, in control of the Congress and the
White House, enacted three Alien and Sedition laws. One of these
laws78 made it illegal to falsely or maliciously criticize the President
71. See BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., THE FIRST IMPEACHMENT 66 (1998).
72- See id.at 99-101.
73. See id. at 105, 107. There was an immediate sense of betrayal. Abigail Adams,
wife of the President, joined the clamor and wrote to her sister, "'[w]hen shall we cease
to have Judases?'" Id. at 110 (quoting Abigail Adams, in New Letters of Abigail Adams,
1788-1801, at 100-01 (Stewart Mitchell ed., 1947)).
74. See id. at 156.
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
76. See MELTON, supranote 71, at 232,260.
77. See Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 69, at 92.
78. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
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or any member of Congress.79
Jeffersonian candidates and supporters felt the fangs of this
law.8" In Vermont, a Jeffersonian congressman, Matthew Lyon, was
convicted and jailed for accusing President Adams of having an
"'unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, and
selfish avarice.' "81 In response to this imprisonment, the editor of
the Vermont Gazette, hoping to help Lyon raise money to pay his
fine, printed an advertisement in the paper addressed " 'to the
enemies of political persecutions in the western district of
Vermont.' "I For this, he was jailed along with Lyon."
So it went, up and down the seaboard.' Jeffersonians disliked
the sedition laws, but they disliked even more the men who enforced
the law: the U.S. marshals who packed the juries with Federalists,
the U.S. Attorneys who prosecuted with unusual zeal, and the
Federalist judges with their biased rulingsY. They especially disliked
Associate Justice Samuel Chase, who, sitting on circuit, at a trial for
seditious libel in 1801, instructed the jury: "If a man attempts to
destroy the confidence of the people in their... supreme magistrate,
he effectually saps the foundation of the
and their legislature,
8
government.
When electoral victory in 1800 gave the Republicans the
presidency and a majority in both houses of Congress, it was payback
time.87 Congress let the sedition laws lapse; Jefferson pardoned
persons convicted under these laws and Congress reimbursed fines
that had been levied. Jefferson then fired several Federalist marshals
and attorneys. 88 Congress, exercising its authority to impeach, went
after the federal judges.8 9
79. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 16, at 185 (noting that the burden of proof in
cases under this Act rested on the defendant who was required to prove good intention
and truth).

80. See id. at 181-88.

81. 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 30 (1919) (quoting

Matthew Lyon).
82. Id. at 32 (quoting advertisement).

83. See id.
84. Dr. Thomas Cooper, editor of the Sunbury and Northumberland Gazette, was
convicted when he editorialized that President Adams had "saddled [us] with the expense
of a permanent navy [and] threatened ...[us] with the existence of a standing army."
FRANCIS

WHARTON,

STATE

TRIALS

OF

THE

UNITED

ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 659

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

STATES

DURING

THE

(1849).

See Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 69, at 93.
United States v. Cooper, 25 Fed. Cas. 631,639 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865).
See HOFFER & HULL, supranote 16, at 181.
See icat 181-82.
Although the Republicans now enjoyed control in the executive and legislative
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John Pickering was Congress's first target-and an easy political
target he was-for reasons unrelated to "treason, bribery, and other
high crimes and misdemeanors." 90 A revolutionary patriot and the
author of New Hampshire's constitution, Pickering was widely
admired until the end of his long public career when continued
drunkenness led to mental deterioration and erratic behavior while
on the bench. 91 Following an inquiry into his conduct, the House
voted to impeach Pickering-not for incapacity due to his mental
state-but for his handling of a particular confiscation case involving
the seizure of a ship charged with smuggling, which was owned by a
prominent Federalist. 92 Without allowing the federal attorney to
present witnesses, Pickering summarily dismissed the case, ordered
the ship restored to the claimant, and refused to grant an appeal of
the case as required by law.93 According to the articles of
impeachment drafted by the House, Pickering "did appear upon the
bench ... in a state of total intoxication ... and did then and there
frequently, in a most profane and indecent manner, invoke the name
of the Supreme Being, to the evil example of all the good citizens of
the United States." 94 The Senate, on a party-line vote, convicted
Pickering. 95
Within an hour, the House voted to impeach Samuel Chase. 96
The charges against him arose out of his conduct in presiding over
various trials involving the sedition laws.
The articles of
impeachment drawn by the House accused Chase of, among other
things, issuing a ruling in a treason case before defense counsel was
allowed to present its argument; refusing to allow a defense witness
to testify; refusing to excuse a prospective juror even though the juror
admitted to having prejudged the case; attempting to induce a grand
jury to indict a newspaper publisher; and when charging a Baltimore
grand jury, publicly criticizing the Jefferson administration from the
bench. 97
branches, several Federalists remained permanently entrenched in their life-tenured
judicial positions. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 16, at 188.
90. See Lynn W. Turner, The Impeachment of John Pickering,54 AM. HIST. REV.
485,487 (1949).
91. See id.at 487-88.
92. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 319-22 (1804).
93. See 13 id.
94. 13 id. at 322.
95. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 16, at 217. Pickering was found guilty on all
counts against him by a vote of 19 to 7 and was removed from office by a vote of 20 to 6.

See id.

96. The House voted 73 to 32 to impeach Chase. See id. at 236.
97. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG., 1238-39; HOFFER & HULL, supra note 16, at 228-37;
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Chase's main defense was that he could not be impeached absent
a charge of an indictable criminaloffense; there were no such charges
in any of the eight Articles of Impeachment.98 Judge Pickering had
raised the same defense and lost, but this time, the Senate accepted
the theory that an official was impeachable only if he committed a
criminal act. 99

4. James H. Peck (1826-31)
James H. Peck, a judge in the District Court of Missouri, was the
next to be impeached by the House and tried by the Senate. Peck
had presided at a trial brought by early settlers of Missouri claiming
title to land under grants issued by the Spanish Crown prior to the
Louisiana Purchase. 10 He ruled against the settlers. 01' To mollify the
immediate public outcry against his decision, Peck wrote a newspaper
article in justification. 1°2 The attorney who lost the case wrote an
article in a rival paper, answering Peck point by point. 3 Incensed,
Peck ordered his arrest, held him in contempt, sentenced him to
twenty-four hours in jail, and disbarred him from the federal court
for eighteen months.1°4
Congressman John Scott of Missouri promptly moved the House
to impeach Peck-which it did by a vote of 123 to 49-because of his
unjust, oppressive, and arbitrary contempt order and his general
gross abuse of power as a judge.105 These charges were much like the
charges against Samuel Chase; therefore, following that example, the

Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 69, at 97-99.
98. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 16, at 245 (noting that "the offenses which had
most often led to conviction in impeachment trials-corruption, extortion, peculation, and
criminal activities-could not be alleged against Chase"); id. at 246 (noting the argument
of attorney Joseph Hopkinson that "removal upon popular disapproval for petty
misconducts ... would fatally undermine the republic by breaking down the separation of
powers").
99. See Thompson & Pollitt, supranote 69, at 99-100. Although the Republicans held
over a two-thirds majority in the Senate, none of the articles of impeachment gained the
requisite two-thirds vote. See id. at 99. The difference in the result of the two almost
identical cases may be due to the fact that President Jefferson had recently dumped VicePresident Aaron Burr, and the Republican senators friendly to Burr bolted the party line
and voted to acquit. See id. at n.72. For a discussion of other explanations for the Senate
vote, see HOFFER & HULL, supra note 16, at 253-54.
100. See ARTHUR J. STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMEs H. PECK 49
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray and Co. 1833).
101. See id.
102. See id. at 49-50.
103. See id. at 50-51.
104. See id. at 51-52.
105. See id. at 46-52.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

Senate voted not to convict because criminal intent had neither been
charged nor proved.0 6 Judicial abuse alone was not an impeachable
offense.'0
5. West H. Humphreys (1862)
Judge West Humphreys was impeached by the House and
charged with treason on the ground that he had incited "revolt and
rebellion" in Tennessee by publicly declaring that secession from the
United States was a "right of the people." 10 8 The Senate convicted
Humphreys and voted unanimously that he be removed from
office. 10 9 Judge Humphreys was by then serving on the District Court
of the Confederate States of America."0
6. William W. Belknap (1876)
William Belknap served as Secretary of War under President
Grant. The House charged him in five Articles with selling lucrative
"post-trader" positions at army posts."' He was paid, through a
middle-man, some $12,000 annually over a period of years.112 Hours
after his impeachment, Belknap turned in his resignation to President
Grant." 3 Although he was no longer a civil officer of the United
States, the Senate tried him anyway." 4 A majority-but not the
required two-thirds-voted guilty."' Those who voted to acquit
16
doubted the Senate's jurisdiction, because Belknap had resigned.
7. Charles Swayne (1903-05)
Charles Swayne of Delaware was appointed by Republican
President Harrison to the District Court of Florida." 7 His mission
106. See id. at 474.
107. See Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 69, at 102.
108. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2277 (1862) (listing the articles of
impeachment against West H. Humphreys).
109. See id. at 2949-53.
110. See Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 69, at 103.
111. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE SITTING FOR THE TRIAL OF WILLIAM W.
BELKNAP 9-13 (Washington, Gov't Printing Off. 1876) [hereinafter BELKNAP
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS].

112. See id. at 9-10.
113. See WALTER EHRLICH, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT:

AN AMERICAN

DILEMMA 59 (1974).

114. See id.
115. See BELKNAP IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS, supra note 111, at 1095.
116. See EHRLICH, supranote 113, at 59.
117. See Honorable Charles E. Littlefield, The Impeachment of Judge Swayne, 13
GREEN BAG 193,193 (1905).
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was to convict the Florida Democrats who had denied Florida
Republicans the right to vote." 8 He was relentless in this task,
extending court sessions to bring all offenders to his bar of justice." 9
His nomination for the bench had been opposed by all Senate
Democrats. 20
The serious impeachment charges against Swayne related to
financial transactions. 21 He was charged with padding his expense
account; accepting from a railroad-then in bankruptcy proceedings
before his court-a free ride to California and back for himself, his
wife, his sister-in-law, and her husband; and had subsequently
approved the costs of the trip as part of the necessary expenses of
operating the railroad."2
Judge Swayne's defense was that even if the charges against him
were accepted as true, those acts did not satisfy the constitutional
definition of high crimes and misdemeanors.23 The House of
Representatives, at this time controlled by the Democrats, rejected
this defense and impeached on an almost solid party-line vote. 24 The
Senate, under Republican control, also by party-line vote, acquitted
on all charges,125 thus realizing Alexander Hamilton's fears that
impeachment decisions might be "regulated more by the comparative
strength26 of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or
guilt.'

1

8. Robert W. Archbald (1912-13)
Judge Archbald, of the United States Commerce Court, was
impeached and convicted on charges of using his judicial office for
personal financial gain. 27 Like Judge Swayne, Judge Archbald had
accepted a free trip for himself and his family from a railroad that
118. See Jacobus ten Broeck, Partisan Politics and Federal Judgeship Impeachment
Since 1903,23 MINN. L. REV. 185,188-89 (1939).
119. See Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 69, at 103.
120. See ten Broeck, supranote 118, at 186.
121. He also was charged with violation of the federal law requiring a federal judge to
live within his district and with maliciously holding certain attorneys in contempt of court.
See PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE MATTER OF THE
IMPEAcHMENT OF CHARLES SWAYNE 8-10 (1905).
122. See id. at 7-8.
123. See id. at 396-97.
124. See ten Broeck, supranote 118, at 188.
125. See id.
126. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 62, at 407.
127. See Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 69, at 104. For a listing of the articles of
impeachment against Archbald, see 3 IMPEACHMENT OF ROBERT W. ARCHBALD
1701-07 (1913).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

was then in litigation before his court. But he did Judge Swayne one
better. As two commentators have noted, "Swayne had gone to
'
California, [but] Archbald had made a grand tour of Europe."128
Archbald was not helped by his position on the Commerce
Court, which had been created by President William Howard Taft to
review the
decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission (the
"ICC"). 129 Increasingly, the ICC ruled against the railroads on behalf
of consumers, and just as insistently, the Commerce Court ruled
against the ICC. 13
This was the political climate when the
Democrats and their "Bull Moose' 31 allies in the Senate voted to
remove Judge Archbald from his office.
9. Harold L. Louderback (1932-33)
Louderback was a judge in the United States District Court in
California who owed his appointment to Senator Samuel
Shortridge. 32 When it came to the appointment of receivers in the
bankruptcy and reorganization cases that came before him, Judge
Louderback saw to it that Samuel Shortridge, Jr., the son of his
benefactor, received more than his share of the lucrative positions.133
The House charged that he had brought "the administration of
justice into disrepute" in "appointing certain bankruptcy receivers,"
with "exorbitant allowances" to "personal and political friends and
associates.'

34

Lacking evidence that Louderback had received any

direct personal financial gain from these appointments, however, the
Senate voted to acquit him. 35
10. Halsted L. Ritter (1936)
Ritter, a federal judge in Florida, followed the practice of
Louderback by appointing friends to preside over bankruptcy
proceedings. 36 But unlike Louderback, Ritter took kickbacks and
128. Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 69, at 104.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 105.
131. Theodore Roosevelt, having lost the Republican nomination to Taft, ran for the
Presidency on the "Bull Moose" ticket. His platform included abolition of the Commerce
Court. See id.
132 See iL
133. See icL
134. 76 CONG. REC. 2914-15 (1933). Louderback was impeached by a vote of 183 to
97. See id. at 4925.
135. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE TRIAL OF
IMPEACHMENT OF HAROLD LOUDERBACK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE OF THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, S. DOC. 73-73, at 825-37 (1933).
136. See 80 CONG. REc. 5602-06 (1936).
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failed to report them on his income tax returns. 137 The Senate voted
to convict. 3 8

11. Harry E. Claiborne (1986)
Judge Claiborne of Nevada was indicted and convicted of tax
evasion-he neglected to report some bribes-and was sent to
prison.

39

He refused to resign, however, and continued to draw his

salary. Provoked by this expenditure of federal 14funds,
the House
0
voted to impeach, and the Senate found him guilty.

12. Alcee L. Hastings (1988-89)
Judge Hastings, from Florida, was charged with conspiring to
solicit a bribe.' 4' Although a federal jury found him not guilty, 142 the
House voted to impeach, and the Senate found him guilty. 43 The
Senate removed him from his judicial position but did not bar him
from holding future federal office.144 Hastings ran for Congress and
was elected and subsequently reelected. 45 He sits today with his
137. While on the bench, Ritter appointed a former law partner to a receivership with
a $75,000 fee. The law partner "kicked back" $4500. Ritter failed to report this on his
income tax return. See id.
138. See id. at 5606. Ritter was convicted by a single vote. See id. While Ritter had
been charged with six articles alleging specific crimes, he was convicted on only the
seventh article, an omnibus recital of the previous charges alleging that he had brought
"his court into scandal and disrepute." Id.
139. See Hearings Before the Senate Impeachment Trial Comm., 99th Cong. 6-10
(1986) (listing the articles of impeachment against Claiborne contained in H.R. Res. 461,
99th Cong. (1986)).
140. See SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMM., PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED
STATES SENATE IN THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF HARRY E. CLAIBORNE, A JUDGE OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA, No. S. Doc. 9948, at 290-98 (1987). In the Claiborne impeachment, the Senate for the first time invoked
its Rule XI (enacted 1936), see SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., SENATE
IMPEACHMENT RULE XI, S. Doc. No. 101-1, at 186-87 (1989), which authorized a
committee to hear testimony and collect evidence. See S. Res. 481, 99th Cong. (1986).
The full Senate would then vote on the recommendation of its Committee. See id.
141. See SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMM., PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED
STATES SENATE IN THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF ALCEE L. HASTINGS, A JUDGE OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, S.
DOC. NO. 18, at 4-8 (1989) [hereinafter HASTINGS IMPEACHMENT].
142 See Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490, 492 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated per
curiam, 988 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The co-conspirator pleaded guilty to offering a
bribe. See id.
143. See HASTINGS IMPEACHMENT, supra note 141, at 698-705. In addition to the
charge of "conspiracy to solicit and accept a bribe," the House charged him with
presenting the jury with false testimony and fabricated evidence. Hastings, 802 F. Supp.
at 492.
144. See HASTINGS IMPEACHMENT, supra note 141, at 709.
145. See GERHARDT, supra note 41, at 60.
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14 6
peers who earlier voted to impeach him.

13. Walter L. Nixon, Jr. (1988-89)
The former Chief Judge of the District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi was convicted by a jury on two counts of
making false statements before a federal grand jury and was
sentenced to prison.147 The grand jury investigation stemmed from
reports that Nixon had accepted a gratuity from a Mississippi
businessman in exchange for asking a local district attorney to halt
the prosecution of the businessman's son. 48 Like Claiborne, Nixon
refused to resign and continued to collect his judicial salary while
serving out his prison sentence.

49

He was impeached by the House

for giving false testimony before the grand jury and for bringing
disrepute to the federal judiciary. 5 The Senate convicted him on the
false testimony charges.'
In summary, the House has impeached twelve federal judges as
well as a senator and a cabinet secretary. 5 2 The Senate voted to

convict: John Pickering for violating laws relating to the seizure of
vessels; West Humphreys for treason; Robert Archbald for bribery;
Halsted Ritter for showing favoritism in appointment of bankruptcy
receivers; and Harry Claiborne, Alcee Hastings, and Walter Nixon
for accepting bribes or lying about accepting bribes-all various

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See id. at 63.
See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,228 (1993).
See id. at 226.
See id.
For a listing of the articles of impeachment against Nixon, see SENATE

IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMM., PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE

IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF WALTER L. NIXON, A JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI, S. DOC. No. 101-22, at

5-7 (1989) [hereinafter NIXON IMPEACHMENT].
151. See Ntron, 506 U.S. at 227. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional
requirement that the Senate "try" impeachment cases was not violated by Senate Rule
XI, which authorizes a Senate Committee to "'receive evidence and take testimony.'
Id. (quoting NIXON IMPEACHMENT, supra note 150, at 186). Under Rule XI, after the
committee has taken evidence, it then presents a report to the full Senate. See id. Here,
in addition to the committee report, both Nixon and the House impeachment managers
submitted extensive final briefs to the full Senate, followed by three hours of oral
argument on the Senate floor. See id. at 227-28.
152. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The House also reprimanded but did
not impeach: Judge Aleck Boarman of Louisiana, who in 1890 took money of the court
for personal use; Judge Emory Speer of Georgia, who accepted railroad passes in 1914
and deposited bankruptcy funds in favored banks; and Judge Grover Moscowitz of New
York, who continued a business in his former law firm and in 1930 appointed members of
that firm to high-paid receiverships. See Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 69, at 114.
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forms of bribery. 3 The Senate voted to acquit Samuel Chase, James
Peck, Charles Swayne, and Harold Louderback.5 4 It did so despite
House impeachment charges that Chase, "in his judicial capacity,"
repeatedly conducted himself "in a manner highly arbitrary,
oppressing, and unjust;"'' 5 that Peck "unjustly, oppressively, and
arbitrarily" abused his authority in issuing a "contempt" order
against a litigant's attorney;" 6 and that Louderback, "while acting as
a district judge," did "on diverse and various occasions so abuse the
power of his high office, that he is charged with tyranny and
oppression, favoritism and conspiracy, whereby he has brought the
administration of justice into disrepute."'5 7
These cases indicate that the Senate, when dealing with judges,
has restricted the impeachment power close to the core of the
constitutional language: There must be "Treason," "Bribery," or
"other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Scandalous conduct in
office does not trigger an impeachment. In this tradition, the Senate
follows the intent of those who framed our Constitution that
impeachment be used sparingly, and only "when great crimes were
committed" and when there are "attempts to subvert the
Constitution." 58
Similar standards were applied against two of our Presidents.
B. PresidentialImpeachments
1. Andrew Johnson (1867-68)
Andrew Johnson is the only President to date impeached by the
House and tried by the Senate. Johnson was acquitted by a single
vote. 59 The Republicans nominated Andrew Johnson in 1864 to run
as their Vice President because he was a Democrat and a Southerner,
and hopefully would help carry some of the crucial border states. 60
Then came President Lincoln's assassination and the difficult task of
reconstruction. From early on, the Congress and President Johnson
were at loggerheads. Congress's program was to punish those
153. See supra notes 77-151.
154. See supra 86-135.
155. IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY STAFF OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., HIGH
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS, SELECTED MATERIALS ON IMPEACHMENT 35 (1974).

156.
157.
158.
159.
1868).
160.

Id. at 40.
Id. at 86.
See supra notes 35, 44.
See 2 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 485-98 (Washington, Gov't Printing Off.
See STEvE TALLY, BLAND AMBITION 134 (1992).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

responsible for the rebellion, enforce the civil rights of the former
slaves, and provide them with economic rehabilitation."' The
President, on the other hand, was generous with his pardons and
vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and other Reconstruction bills
passed by Congress.162
The situation reached a climax when the President attempted to
replace Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, who had been tough on the
South, with Lorenzo Thomas, who had been more sympathetic to the
South. 63 Congress passed a law, the Tenure of Office Act, on March
2, 1867, requiring the advice and consent of the Senate for the
removal of any officer whose appointment required the advice and
consent of the Senate; 6 Congress had in mind Secretary of War
Stanton. The Act further provided that violation of the Act would be
an impeachable offense. 65
Despite this law, President Johnson went ahead with his
intention to fire Stanton. 66 Two days later the House voted for
impeachment. 67 It charged that Johnson had failed in his
constitutional obligation "to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed," particularly the law requiring the advice and consent of
the Senate prior to firing Stanton.168 After several weeks of intense
and acrimonious debate, the Senate voted to acquit Johnson thirtyfive to nineteen, one vote short of the two-thirds required in
impeachment trials. 6 9 Seven Republicans voted with the Democrats,
apparently on the belief that there was no impeachable offense.7

161. See EHRLICH, supra note 113, at 56.
162. See id, at 56-57.
163. See id. at 57.

164. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, § 1, 14 Stat. 430,430.
165. See id.
166. See EHRLICH, supra note 113, at 57.
167. See 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, supra note 159, at 2. The vote in favor of

impeachment was 126 to 74. See I id.
168. Article I of the Impeachment Charges recited that Andrew Johnson
unmindful of the high duties of his office, of his oath of office, and of the
requirement of the Constitution that he should take care that the laws be
faithfidly executed, did unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution and laws
of the United States, issue an order in writing for the removal of Edwin M.
Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War.
I id. at 6 (emphasis added).
169. See 2 id. at 495-98.

170. See 2 id. When Johnson died, per his request, his body was buried wrapped in the
American flag, with his head resting atop a copy of the Constitution. See TALLY, supra
note 160, at 140.
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2. Richard M. Nixon (1974)
Richard M. Nixon has been the only other President to face
impeachment charges. In July 1974, the House Judiciary Committee
adopted three Articles of Impeachment relating to abuses of
power.' 7 ' They charged that Nixon "repeatedly engaged in conduct
violating the constitutional rights of citizens"; impaired "the due and
the proper administration of justice"; and contravened "the laws
governing agencies of the executive branch.' 1 72 Among the specific
acts alleged were the attempt to obtain confidential information in
income tax returns, misleading the FBI, misusing the CIA to obtain
information and using this information for purposes unrelated to
national security, and maintaining a secret investigative unit within
the Office of the President. 7 3 Impeachment proceedings were
abandoned when, on August 9, 1974, President Nixon resigned his
office. 74 This was shortly after the release of tapes incriminating the
President in the cover-up of the Watergate burglary. 75
V. CONCLUSION

The allegations against President Clinton are that he committed
perjury during his deposition in Jones v. Clinton when he denied
having had a sexual affair with Monica Lewinsky, that he suborned
perjury when he allegedly persuaded Lewinsky to deny in an affidavit
the same sexual relationship, and that he may have obstructed justice
when his friend Vernon Jordan helped Lewinsky find a job in New
York until that action is concluded. 6 Ordinarily, prosecutors do not
investigate perjury in a civil action. Former Special Counsel
Lawrence E. Walsh wrote that "[i]n sixty years of practice, I have
never known this to happen.' 17 7 In any event, to violate federal law
171. See COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 1-4 (1974).
172. Id. at 4.
173. See id. at 2-3.
174. See GERHARDT, supra note 41, at 23.
175. See id. at 32 n.50.
176. See supra note 7 (discussing the grounds for impeachment contained in Starr's
report to the House). Whether or not Jordan helped other former White House interns in
their job search, Lewinsky is someone special. Her sponsor, Walter Kaye, contributes
large sums of money to the Democratic National Committee. Any politician would be
happy to do him a favor.
177. Lawrence E. Walsh, Kenneth Starr and the Independent Counsel Act, N.Y. REV.
OF BOOKS, Mar. 5, 1998, at A4. According to E. Michael McCann, former chairman of
the criminal section of the American Bar Association, civil perjury is "'the least
prosecuted crime in the United States.'" Henry Weinstein, Civil Perjury Prosecutions
Rare, Experts Say, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 16, 1998, at A6. Weinstein
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the perjury or subornation of perjury must be material to the issues in
the Jones case. 78 The trial judge presiding over the Jones case has
ruled that the alleged perjury is not material and that the supposed
7
Lewinsky affair simply is extraneous to the matter at hand. 1
But in a larger sense, the allegations against Clinton do not fit
the language, spirit, or history of our Impeachment Clause. Where
are the great and dangerous offenses "against the state" demanded
by the framers of our Constitution?' 8 Where, as in the Andrew
Johnson impeachment, is the failure "to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed"? 8'
Where, as in the Richard Nixon
impeachment, are the "[a]ttempts to subvert the Constitution"? 82
Should the House of Representatives impeach President
Clinton, it would turn the law of impeachment on its head. It would
be the first time in our history of over two hundred years that a
federal officer is charged with misconduct unrelated to the discharge
of the duties of his office. It would be the second recent blow to the
office of the Chief Executive. The first came when the Supreme
Court held that Paula Jones could sue the President now, rather than
after he leaves office, on a civil action that arose prior to the time he
took office. 183 Out of this came the Lewinsky affair and a runaway
special prosecutor. 84 We might or might not see a comparable
reports that nationwide, only one percent of criminal prosecutions are perjury cases. See

i
178. For definitions of perjury and subornation of perjury, see supranote 7.
179. On January 29, 1998, Judge Susan Wright ruled that Paula Jones's lawyers could
not use any evidence involving Monica Lewinsky because such use could interfere with
the Kenneth Starr criminal investigation. See Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290, slip op.
at 2 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 29, 1998) (finding that the potential value of evidence regarding
Lewinsky to the Jones case was outweighed by the potential delay in continuing to seek
discovery into this matter). On April 1, 1998, Judge Wright granted President Clinton's
motion for summary judgment in the Paula Jones case. See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp.
657, 679 (E.D. Ark. 1998). She wrote that her earlier suppression of the "pattern and
practice (Lewinsky) evidence" was proper because:
[w]hatever relevance such evidence may have to prove other elements of
plaintiff's case, it does not have anything to do with the issues ... whether
plaintiff herself was the victim of alleged quid pro quo or hostile work
environment sexual harassment, whether the President and Ferguson conspired
to deprive her of her civil rights, or whether she suffered emotional distress so
severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
Id. at 678-79.
180. 2 RECORDS, supranote 19, at 550 (statement of George Mason).
181. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
182. 2 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 550 (statement of George Mason).
183. See Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1652 (1997).
184. Special Counsel Kenneth Starr was appointed under a law designed to guard us
from our guardians. See 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1994). Has he run amok? He kept Susan
McDougal locked in jail for refusing to answer grand jury questions about the President.
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congressional

investigating

committee,

although

Alexander Hamilton warned that impeachment would "enlist all the

animosities, partialities, influence and interest on one side or the
other." 185
"Fearing for the independence of the Executive," those who
wrote our Constitution included the impeachment power to guard

against "tyranny and oppression"'186 and to reach great and dangerous

When her 22 month "contempt" sentence expired, he subpoenaed her back to ask the
same questions, despite her announced defiance. She was transported across the country
in shackles, attired in a bold orange jail suit. She now faces a second prison term for, in
her words, "refusing to lie about the President." Russell Baker, For Whom the Chains
Clank- Kenneth Starr's Deep Game, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1998, at A23. Starr served a
subpoena on a 16-year-old boy, while in school, to ask what the boy knew about his
father's business connection with Whitewater. See Tactics CalledAbusive by Critics and
the Ensnared, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998, at A31. He grilled Lewinsky's mother for two
days about her daughter's sex life. See Mother of Intern Makes Appearance Before Grand
Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, at Al. He subpoenaed, for the first time in history,
Secret Service agents to testify about the President's movements. See In re Sealed Case,
148 F.3d 1079, 1079-80 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam); David Johnston, Judge Asked to
Bar Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1998, at Al. He demanded that Lewinsky's lawyer
turn over the notes of their interviews. See Jill Abramson, Starr Subpoenas Notes and
Case File of Lewinsky's Former Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1998, at A17. He asked
Hillary Clinton about conversations she had with her husband. See John M. Broder,
Hillary Clinton Declines to Answer Some of Starr's Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1998,
at A21. He seems to have violated every dearly held privilege except that of the
confessional.
Starr's victims include the First and Fourth Amendments. He demanded a list of
books Monica Lewinsky purchased from two book stores. See Doreen Carvajal, Book
Industry Vows to Fight2 Subpoenas Issued by Starr, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at A20. He
subpoenaed Sidney Blumenthal, a White House aide, and asked whether he had told
various reporters that two of Starr's lieutenants had court records of abusive misconduct.
See John M. Broder, A Clinton Advisor Details Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1998, at
Al. So much for our First Amendment freedom of speech.
The Fourth Amendment is designed to protect against unreasonable searches and
seizures-to protect our privacy. Taping phone calls without the caller's consent is illegal
in Maryland. When Bob Weiner suggested that the local prosecutor investigate Linda
Tripp (a Marylander) for tape-recording the calls from Monica Lewinsky, he was
subpoenaed by Starr's grand jury. See David Stout, A Phone Call Puts a Man on the Spot,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1998, at A8. Starr informed the White House that he planned a
search of the entire White House living quarters for Mrs. Clinton's billing records when
she worked at the Rose law firm back in Arkansas, despite the Fourth Amendment
requirement that a search warrant "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. In a compromise, Jane Sherburne, then on the White House
Counsel's staff, agreed to make a top-to-bottom search including, as Starr required
searching bathrooms, underwear drawers, and even combing through Chelsea Clinton's
possessions. See Jeffrey Toobin, Starr Can't Help It. But Is the Prosecutorto Blame, or
the Law that Created Him?, THE NEW YORKER, May 18, 1998, at 32,35. So much for the
Fourth Amendment.
185. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 62, at 396.
186. DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 57, at 126 (statement of
James Iredell).
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offenses "against the state."1" To extend the Impeachment Clause to
include all manner of things-here, a denial of a consensual sexual
affair-would, as George Mason feared, make the "Executive the
mere creature of the Legislature.' 1 88 That is not our way, that is not
our Constitution.

187. 2 RECORDS, supranote 19, at 550 (statement of George Mason).
188. 1 id. at 86 (statement of George Mason).

